I INTRODUCTION
In September 2013, the Commonwealth Government implemented 'Operation Sovereign Borders', a border protection policy that seeks to prevent asylum seekers reaching Australia's territory. 1 The policy involves a joint multi-agency taskforce, Border Protection Command ('BPC'), 2 using naval vessels to intercept and turn back asylum seekers travelling by boat once they reach Australia's contiguous zone. 3 This typically involves BPC towing or escorting the boats back to other states. 4 As of 28 January 2015, BPC had turned back 15 boats containing 429 asylum seekers. 5 In one incident on 1 May 2014, BPC intercepted a boat carrying 18 asylum seekers near Ashmore Reef (an Australian territory in the ocean west of Darwin) 6 and escorted it back to Indonesia 7 (after adding three more). 8 In another incident in late June 2014, BPC intercepted a boat containing Sri Lankan asylum seekers of Sinhalese and Tamil ethnicities west of Cocos Islands and detained them, before transferring them to Sri Lankan authorities on 6 July. 9 This article examines whether such actions taken under Australia's turn back policy breach Australia's non-refoulement obligations under art 33(1) of the Convention Relating to the No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 19 State and scholarly opinions as to whether art 33(1) applies extraterritorially have centred around the meaning of 'return'. The majority of scholars, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ('UNHCR') in its Advisory Opinion ('UNHCR's Advisory Opinion'), 20 contend that art 33(1) applies extraterritorially, thereby adopting a wide interpretation. However, some states (including the Commonwealth Government) 21 and state superior courts contend that art 33(1) only applies to a refugee within a state's territory, thereby adopting a narrow interpretation. 22 The authority supporting the narrow interpretation is the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sale v Haitian Centers Council Inc ('Sale'). 23 The case arose due to a change in the United States ('US') policy surrounding the return of Haitian refugees intercepted on the high seas. 24 Between 1981 and 1992 potential Haitian refugees intercepted on the high seas were brought to the US for formal processing. 25 However, following a coup against the Haitian President in 1991, the number of Haitian asylum seekers fleeing Haiti increased. 26 In response to such increase, in 1992 the US changed its policy such that all Haitians intercepted on the high seas were returned to Haiti. 27 The US Supreme Court ruled (inter alia) that the US President's Executive Order that all aliens intercepted on the high seas could be repatriated was not limited by art 33. In other words, the US Court ruled that art 33 did not have an extraterritorial effect. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 ('VCLT') art 31, 28 which is widely accepted as reflecting the CIL rule for the interpretation of treaties, 29 requires treaty provisions to 'be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose'. 30 Context includes (inter alia) any agreements made between all parties when concluding the treaty. 31 State practice applying the treaty that establishes the parties' agreement regarding its interpretation and any relevant rules of international law must be taken into account together with the context. 32 These factors are integral to a treaty's interpretation because they form part of the legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation within which treaties must be interpreted and applied. 33 Therefore, while the starting point for interpretation is the text of art 33(1) itself, this must be read in light of its context and the Refugee Convention's object and purpose. 34 A construction that advances the Refugee Convention's object and purpose should be adopted over a purely literal construction.
A Method of Interpreting Treaties

B Applying the General Rule of Interpretation 1 Object and Purpose
The preamble to the Refugee Convention indicates that it aims to ensure refugees have fundamental rights, 36 signifying a humanitarian object and purpose; 37 a purpose the UNHCR contends is to 'protect especially vulnerable individuals from persecution'. 38 The object and purpose of treaties of humanitarian character, like the Refugee Convention, carry additional weight when interpreting treaties 39 39 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 104. do not have any interest of their own; they merely have … a common interest', being the accomplishment of higher purposes represented by such treaties' raison d'être.
2 Ordinary Meaning of the Words
The ordinary meaning of 'return' includes 'to send back' and 'to bring, send, or put back to a former … place'. 41 However, the majority in Sale held that 'return' has a narrower legal meaning due to insertion of '("refouler")' following 'return'; 42 it noted that 'return' is not listed as a translation of 'refouler' in two respected English-French dictionaries. 43 Therefore, it concluded that 'refouler' must restrict the meaning of 'return' and does not indicate equal meaning.
The Sale majority determined the English translation of 'refouler' includes to 'repulse', 'repel', 'refuse entry', and 'drive back'. 44 They considered this restricted the meaning of 'return' to a 'defensive act of resistance or exclusion at a border rather than an act of transporting someone to a particular destination'. 45 However, the majority adopted an even narrower interpretation, concluding 'return' only refers to a refugee already within a state's territory but not yet resident there. 46 Sale was cited with approval in the subsequent House of Lords' decision, R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport ('European Roma Rights'). 47 However, in a strong dissent in Sale, Blackmun J condemned the majority's reasoning, calling their 'tortured reading unsupported and unnecessary', 48 and stating they led themselves astray by dispensing with the ordinary meaning of 'return' and adopting from the outset the assumption that 'return' had a narrower legal meaning. 49 Blackmun J noted the language used is unambiguous: vulnerable refugees shall not be returned. 50 It imposes no territorial limitation on the application of art 33(1); restricting only where refugees may be sent.
51
The Sale majority accepted that 'refouler' refers to rejection at the border; yet concluded 'return' did not apply to refugees outside a state's territory. These conclusions contradict each other. At a minimum, the majority ought to have concluded that 'return' also applied to refugees at the border yet outside a state's territory. The majority failed to give 'return' its plain meaning, 54 instead adopting an interpretation that excluded actions that actually deliver a refugee back to their persecutors, the plainest meaning to be attached to 'return'. 55 Goodwin-Gill called it a decision of 'domestic, not international law', 56 stating the majority takes 'passages out of context, misquotes academic and other commentators, misrepresents the sense of the UNHCR Handbook, and ignores whatever might obstruct its policy decision '. 57 Contrary to the Sale majority's conclusion, 'return' and 'refouler' do not limit territorially art 33(1)'s application. Article 33(1) prohibits a refugee's return 'in any manner whatsoever', 58 indicating an intention 'to prohibit any act of removal or rejection' that places a refugee at risk of persecution. 59 The formal description of the act, whether it be expulsion, return, or rejection, is immaterial. 60 It covers 'any imaginable action exposing the person concerned to the risk of persecution', 61 including action taken beyond a State's territory, at entry points, and in international zones. 62 Such actions are open from the use of 'return' as they constitute a form of 'sending back', which represents its literal meaning.
When interpreting a treaty, a text construction that advances a treaty's object and purpose should be adopted over a purely literal construction. 63 The Sale majority acknowledged its narrow interpretation, which allows fleeing refugees to be gathered and returned to the country they sought to escape, violating art 33's spirit. 64 Yet, it did not give consideration to the fact that its interpretation, which allow states to reach outside their territory and refoule refugees to countries where they face a risk of persecution, is fundamentally inconsistent with the humanitarian object and purpose of the Refugee Convention, 65 which seeks to provide rights to, and protect, refugees. 66 Similarly, the United States Government's response to UNHCR's Advisory Opinion ('US Observations'), which contends art 33(1) does not apply extraterritorially, acknowledges the Refugee Convention's humanitarian character, 67 but does not refer to this when interpreting art 33(1), 68 indicating they failed to take into account the Refugee Convention's object and purpose as required by the VCLT. 69 The US Government's narrow interpretation leads to a situation where refugees who reach a state's territory are protected, but those who do not are not protected. This encourages states to implement interception policies to prevent refugees entering their territory and gaining protection, leaving fleeing refugees with nowhere to go. This is incompatible with the Refugee Convention's object and purpose to protect refugees.
Any ambiguity in the terms' literal interpretation 'must be resolved in favour of an interpretation' consistent with the treaty's humanitarian character. 70 Consequently, reading art 33(1) in light of the Refugee Convention's object and purpose supports art 33(1)'s extraterritorial application because it conforms to the Refugee Convention's humanitarian character, whereas a narrow interpretation does not.
Context
The Refugee Convention's provisions form the context within which to interpret art 33(1).
(a) Article 33(1)'s Significance
Article 33(1) is one of the few provisions to which reservations are not allowed, 72 and its only exception is art 33(2), 73 when a refugee poses a security risk to the state. 74 This illustrates art 33(1)'s significance in the Refugee Convention, 75 as it is almost a non-derogable obligation.
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Its non-refoulement obligation constitutes an 'essential … component of international refugee protection', 77 signifying it has a fundamentally humanitarian character.
78
This supports an extraterritorial interpretation because a narrow interpretation is inconsistent with art 33(1)'s humanitarian character. 
(b) Article 33(2)
The Sale majority and US Observations contend that art 33(2) supports a narrow interpretation of art 33(1). 79 Article 33(2) only applies to refugees who are dangerous to the country in which they are in. 80 It does not apply to refugees outside a state's territory, even if they pose a danger. 81 The Sale majority reasoned that if art 33(1) applied extraterritorially, art 33(2) 'would create an absurd anomaly' where dangerous refugees intercepted on the high seas are entitled to protection, while those residing in a state are not. 82 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume art 33(1) was limited to applying to refugees within a state because art 33(2) was similarly limited. 83 This argument contains fundamental flaws. Firstly, the provisions serve different purposes; 84 art 33(1) concerns protecting refugees 85 whereas art 33(2) concerns protecting States from dangerous refugees. 86 Article 33(2) permits states to return dangerous refugees within their territory, not seize and return refugees outside their territory which 'expresses precisely' the Refugee Convention's objectives and concerns. 87 That 'only a refugee already in a country can pose a danger to the country … proves nothing'. 88 Secondly, the approach is methodologically wrong. 89 It uses 'the exception to infer the rule', 90 failing to recognise that '[n]onreturn is the rule' and art 33(2) is the exception. 91 Due to these flaws, this argument carries no weight.
(c) Other Provisions with Territorial Requirements
The Refugee Convention contains numerous provisions that expressly include territorial requirements, and these generally limit their scope to a state's territory. 92 This leads one to infer that where a provision was intended to apply only within a state's territory the drafters used express words to convey that intention. 93 Article 33(1) contains no such words, indicating that it is not territorially limited.
The US Observations contend that it is unreasonable to interpret every provision as applying extraterritorially absent an express limitation. 94 This stance is erroneous. 95 The Refugee Convention aims to protect refugees globally. 96 Consequently, it is reasonable that its provisions apply extraterritorially absent an express limitation because the refugees it aims to protect regularly have to flee persecution through extraterritorial zones.
Factors Taken into Account together with Context (a) Subsequent State Practice
Subsequent state practice that establishes the parties' agreement regarding a treaty's interpretation must be taken into account together with a treaty's context. 97 If all states parties act in a way that leads to an inference of common intention, that practice is material to a treaty's interpretation. 98 However, if only some states act a particular way according to their interpretation, the practice is not material. 99 This is because the actions of only some states cannot impose obligations on other states parties, as they have not consented to be bound in that way. 100 In addition, states' actions can be highly self-serving and not reflective of a treaty's correct interpretation.
101 This is especially so when the practice observed is that of states, whose behaviour a provision aims to constrain to protect individuals, 102 as in the case of art 33(1). Consequently, care must be taken when looking at state practice.
The UNHCR contends that Conclusions of its Executive Committee ('ExCom'), which consists of member states that demonstrate an interest in solving refugee problems, 103 express state practice. 104 While non-binding, these Conclusions represent agreements reached by member states and are relevant to the interpretation of refugee issues. 105 Some ExCom Conclusions refer to non-refoulement's importance irrespective of whether a refugee is within a state's territory. 106 Some international refugee and human rights instruments also support non-refoulement's extraterritorial application, as they do not territorially restrict non-refoulement obligations. 107 127 It considered it to be unconscionable to interpret art 2(1) in a way that allowed states to commit violations on another state's territory which they could not commit on their own. 128 Consequently, it interpreted 'subject to its jurisdiction' as referring not to where a violation occurred but to the relationship between the individual and the state. 129 The ICJ confirmed this in With respect to the ECHR, the ECtHR held that a state's jurisdiction extends extraterritorially where its authorities' acts produce extraterritorial effects. 131 This 'derives from the fact of such control' exercised directly or through agents.
132 Therefore, extraterritorial jurisdiction occurs where states exercise authority or control over a territory or individuals. 133 In Banković v Belgium, the ECtHR stressed the exceptional nature of this principle. 134 While a State's jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial, 135 it can be exercised extraterritorially, but this is limited by, and subordinate to, other states' sovereign territorial rights. 136 Consequently, the ECtHR limited extraterritorial jurisdiction to cases where [a] State, through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.
137
In acknowledging extraterritorial jurisdiction, the ECtHR adopted the HRC's reasoning, stating that the ECHR art1 'cannot be interpreted so as to allow a state party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on' another state's territory which it could not perpetrate on its own.
In because the attack's victims were not under the NATO States' jurisdiction. 144 Therefore, jurisdiction does not exist simply because a state's actions impact upon a person. 145 However, this is distinguishable from situations involving the refoulement of maritime refugees by vessels, as vessels, which have a more physical and enduring presence than planes, are used to intercept, and often detain, refugees. In Öcalan v Turkey, effective physical control exerted over persons was sufficient to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction.
146 Sufficient control also exists where 'state vessels use their physical presence and strength' in order to make other vessels turn back 147 and where military vessels intercept refugees in international waters.
148
These decisions support the proposition that states exercise de facto jurisdiction over territory outside their national territory if they, or their agents, attempt to exercise effective control over persons within that territory. 149 This requires a state to respect persons' rights when they are within the state's power or effective control, regardless of where they are, 150 making the existence of effective authority and control decisive. In addition, by choosing to have a contiguous zone and patrolling it in order to prevent infringements of immigration laws, 152 a state exercises effective control over that zone through the exercise of public powers as identified by the ECtHR. 153 These actions alone bring refugees within the contiguous zone under the state's jurisdiction, entitling them to rights associated with that jurisdiction.
(ii) De Jure Control
Recent decisions of international courts and bodies support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction where states exert de jure control. Vessels on the high seas are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state whose flag they fly.
155
The ECtHR has recognised a state's extraterritorial jurisdiction in cases concerning acts carried out on vessels flying the state's flag. 156 Where control is exercised over persons on board such a vessel, there exists de jure control.
157 This is particularly relevant to the detention of refugees on government vessels, which fly their state flag, bringing refugees on board within the state's 144 160 In this case, Spanish authorities intercepted 369 migrants off the Mauritanian coast. The Committee concluded Spain maintained control over the migrants from the time their vessel was rescued and throughout the subsequent identification and repatriation process in Mauritania. 161 This indicates de jure control can be decisive in establishing extraterritorial jurisdiction.
(iii) Applicability to the Refugee Convention
Treaties must remain dynamic. 163 Their meanings change depending on the development of international legal and factual circumstances and concepts, 164 such as the development of general legal principles and changes in State behaviour.
Given the Declaration of States Parties that the Refugee Convention be interpreted in conformity with international human rights treaties, 165 and that treaties and the principle of non-refoulment must remain dynamic and able to adapt to changing concepts and circumstances over time, 166 the Refugee Convention ought to be interpreted in a manner consistent with the increased recognition of human rights treaties' extraterritorial application. 167 The HRC's and ECtHR's reasoning applies equally to the Refugee Convention. Article 33(1) should not be interpreted so as to allow states to reach outside their territory and refoule refugees to territories where they face a risk of persecution as this would frustrate the Refugee Convention's humanitarian object and purpose 168 and is inconsistent with the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 169 158 Ibid 133 [81] . 159 See CAT art 3(1). 160 Interpreting art 33(1) in a manner consistent with this extraterritorial jurisdiction concept requires that it apply extraterritorially wherever states exercise jurisdiction, which occurs where they exercise effective control and authority over refugees. 170 This concept was not addressed in Sale or European Roma Rights, and therefore, has not been rejected by these state superior courts. 171 It has received support from the United Kingdom Supreme Court, which explained that art 33(1)'s protection attached to refugees subject to a state's jurisdiction. 172 Additionally, interception methods exist primarily for migration control and often lack sufficient safeguards for identifying those needing protection, 173 acting as a barrier to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' right to seek asylum, 174 to which the Refugee Convention's Preamble specifically refers. 175 Preventing refugees from presenting a request for asylum may breach this right. 176 Therefore, an interpretation of Article 33(1) that allows States to intercept and refoule refugees outside their territory is inconsistent with this fundamental right to request asylum.
Territorial Scope of Art 33(1)
Having discussed various influential factors, it is necessary to consider these in accordance with the general rule to determine the interpretation of art 33(1).
With regards to the VCLT's requirement to interpret a treaty in good faith, 177 Lord Bingham in European Roma Rights stated that 'there is no want of good faith if a state interprets a treaty as meaning what it says and declines to do anything significantly greater than' what it has agreed to. 178 Lord Bingham referred to ICJ decisions, 179 which held that 'good faith' 'is not itself a source of obligation where none' otherwise exists. 180 Such an imposition does not occur with respect to art 33(1)'s wide interpretation. The wide interpretation is open on the words used, meaning the good faith principle is being used only to choose one interpretation over the other, not to impose an obligation that does not otherwise exist.
As stated earlier, the ordinary meaning of 'return' means 'to send back', 181 and the ordinary meaning of 'refouler' means to 'repulse', 'repel', 'refuse entry', and 'drive back'.
182 When these terms are read in light of their context and the Refugee Convention's object and purpose, it is clear the wide interpretation applies. The phrase 'in any manner whatsoever' 183 which follows 'return' and 'refouler' lends itself to an interpretation that prohibits any kind of act 170 leading to a refugee's return, regardless of whether that act occurs inside or outside a state's territory. 184 It encompasses non-return and non-rejection.
185
The Refugee Convention's fundamentally humanitarian object and purpose 186 would be frustrated if states were allowed to avoid their obligations simply by reaching outside their territory. 187 It would render the entire Refugee Convention irrelevant. 188 Therefore, the object and purpose support an interpretation that art 33(1) applies extraterritorially.
The Refugee Convention's provisions add further weight to an interpretation that art 33(1) applies extraterritorially. Article 33(1) is an essential element of international refugee protection. 189 The protection of refugees is seriously undermined if states can determine the Refugee Convention's point of application. 190 The express inclusion of territorial requirements in the Refugee Convention's other provisions 191 supports the conclusion that one would have been included in art 33(1) if it were intended to have a territorial limitation.
192
The relevant rules of international law provide strong support for Article 33(1)'s extraterritorial application. Scholars and subsequent state practice, evident by the Declaration of States Parties, indicate the Refugee Convention must be interpreted in conformity with international human rights treaties. 193 An examination of human rights treaties reveals their application extends to wherever states exercise jurisdiction, 194 which occurs whenever they, or their agents, exert effective control or authority over persons. When interpreting art 33(1) in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms, considered in light of the totality of these factors, it is apparent that art 33(1) is clear and unambiguous; it establishes an obligation not to return a refugee to a country where they face a risk of persecution, and this 'applies wherever a State exercises jurisdiction, including … on the high seas'.
C Preparatory Work
Article 32 of the VCLT allows recourse to supplementary means of interpretation to confirm the meaning resulting from applying the general rule (under art 31), or to re-determine its meaning if found to be ambiguous, obscure, manifestly absurd, or unreasonable.
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Given the meaning of art 33(1) (resulting from applying the general rule) is unambiguous, the Refugee Convention's preparatory work can only confirm art 33(1)'s meaning. 198 The US Observations having relied heavily on the Refugee Convention's travaux préparatoires shows they placed too much significance on its drafting history.
1 Travaux Préparatoires
During the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee that helped draft the Refugee Convention, it was stated that 'turning a refugee back to the frontier of the country where his life … is threatened … would be tantamount to delivering him into the hands of his persecutors'. 200 The United States' representative argued that regardless of whether a refugee was at the frontier or had crossed the border, they should not be turned back. 201 These comments indicate that art 33(1) was not understood by the drafters to have a territorial limitation.
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Grahl-Madsen, a leading commentator on the Refugee Convention's drafting, provides a useful insight into the definition of terms and the agreement of states. According to him, 'refoulement' was used in Belgium and France to describe an informal way of removing persons from a territory and to describe 'non-admittance at the frontier', and the English translation of 'refoulement' corresponds to Anglo-American concepts of 'exclusion' and 'refusal of leave to land'. During a session of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, the Swiss delegate, recognising that various interpretations could be attached to the words 'expel or return', stated that 'return' applied only to refugees who had already entered a state, but were not yet resident there, 204 and that 'refouler' could not apply to refugees who had not yet entered a state's territory. 205 The representatives of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden agreed with this interpretation. 206 From these discussions, Grahl-Madsen concluded that art 33(1) applies to refugees who are within a State's territory. 207 While he acknowledged that 'refoulement' may mean 'nonadmittance at the frontier', he felt it was 'clear the prohibition against "refoulement" in Article 33 … did not cover this aspect of … "refoulement"'. 208 Grahl-Madsen noted the peculiar result this interpretation leads to, quoting Robinson, another scholar of this era, who stated 'if a refugee has succeeded in eluding the frontier guards, he is safe; if he has not, it is his hard luck'. 209 He noted, however, that 'public opinion is apt to concern itself much more with the individual who has set foot on the nation's territory … than with people only seen as shadows'. 210 Therefore, according to Grahl-Madsen, the travaux préparatoires support a territorial limitation on art 33(1). 211 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, among others, suggest the most accurate assessment of the travaux préparatoires is 'that there was no unanimity' among states. 212 Grahl-Madsen was misguided in drawing conclusions based on statements of several delegates, as they did not represent a consensus among those present. 213 In addition, the Swiss and Dutch representatives' comments related to their concern about art 33(1) requiring states to admit refugees in mass influx situations; 214 they never addressed art 33(1)'s extraterritorial application separate of this issue. 215 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem also note there are 'significant shortcomings' to relying on the travaux préparatoires of 'treaties negotiated at a time and in circumstances far distant from the point at which the question of interpretation and application arises'. 216 Interpretations of treaties must remain dynamic and be able to adapt to changing concepts and circumstances over time, 217 as must the principle of non-refoulement, which must be construed in light of the concept of asylum. 218 Consequently, the Refugee Convention's travaux préparatoires must be approached with care, as the world as it existed in 1951 is vastly different to the present day. 219 This leads one to conclude that recourse to the Refugee Convention's preparatory work cannot confirm art 33(1)'s general rule interpretation. However, this failure to confirm the meaning does not affect the interpretation's validity, which is clear and unambiguous. 220 
D Summing Up: Extraterritorial Application of Art 31(1)
The above analysis supports an interpretation that art 33(1) applies extraterritorially in all areas outside a refugee's country of origin. 221 The decisive factor is not a refugee's location, but whether the refugee is under the relevant state's jurisdiction, 222 which is exercised wherever a state exercises effective control or authority over persons. 223 
III CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW STATUS OF NON-REFOULEMENT
Many Middle Eastern, South Asian, and Southeast Asian states are not States Parties to the Refugee Convention or Refugee Protocol, 224 making it necessary to address whether nonrefoulement has developed into a CIL rule encompassing art 33(1). If it has, it binds all states. 225 The majority of scholars and bodies agree that non-refoulement has gained CIL status, 226 and some specifically argue this encompasses art 33(1). 227 However, Hathaway, whose expertise in international refugee law is highly regarded, maintains there is insufficient evidence to justify this claim, 228 arguing the standard of state practice and opinio juris are not yet met.
There are two strands of non-refoulement: persecution, which prohibits a refugee's return to territories where he or she faces a risk of persecution, 230 such as is in art 33(1); 231 and torture, which prohibits a person's return to territories where he or she faces a risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or other violations of fundamental human rights, 232 such as the CAT's prohibition against torture. 233 This article addresses the persecution strand's CIL status.
A Treaties Crystallising into Custom
In international refugee law, State practice relevant to the determination of CIL is principally derived from treaties, 234 which acts as a foundation for the development of CIL. 235 In North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v Denmark) (Judgment) ('North Sea Continental Shelf'), the ICJ identified three elements material to determining whether a treaty rule has crystallised into a CIL rule. 236 Firstly, the provision must be of a fundamentally norm-creating character.
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Secondly, a very widespread and representative participation in the treaty might 'suffice of itself'. 238 Thirdly, State practice in conformity with the provision should have been both extensive and virtually uniform, and should indicate a general recognition of a rule of law.
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This third element in fact expresses the two elements required to show the development of CIL independently of a treaty: 240 consistent state practice and opinio juris.
B Relevance of Torture Instruments
Non-refoulement's torture strand is generally accepted as being embedded in CIL. 242 Due to this and the considerable structural similarities between, and reasoning behind, the two nonrefoulement strands, an examination of non-refoulement to torture provisions assists in addressing the norm-creating character of non-refoulement to persecution.
A comparison of each strand's most well-known provision illustrates their similarities. The CAT art 3(1) prohibits a person's return if he or she is likely to be tortured. 243 The Refugee Convention art 33(1) prohibits a refugee's return if their life or freedom would be threatened for a convention reason. 244 Both prohibit a certain class of persons' return to a certain class of threat.
Prohibition to torture instruments usually apply to 'any persons' 245 whereas prohibition to persecution instruments are often limited to refugees. 246 However, this difference is not material because 'any persons' encompasses refugees, meaning both strands can be said to prohibit the return of refugees to the relevant risk. This means the only material difference these two prohibition strands is what a person cannot be returned to, being persecution versus torture. The two strands' similarities are highlighted by numerous international instruments which do not differentiate between the two, referring only to 'non-refoulement'. 247 Due to these similarities, instruments concerning non-refoulement to torture can evidence the normcreating character of non-refoulement to persecution.
The same cannot be said for the second and third elements identified in North Sea Continental Shelf. The two strands protect refugees from different things, persecution versus torture. This means that general non-refoulement, and non-refoulement to torture, cannot form the basis upon which a common opinio juris is formed, or state practice observed, 248 with respect to nonrefoulement to persecution. Consequently, in relation to the third element, it is necessary to consider evidence specific to non-refoulement to persecution. In relation to the second element, if widespread and representative participation is to 'suffice of itself' to establish a CIL rule, 249 then the 'participation' acts to replace state practice and opinio juris. Therefore, only 'participation' that could otherwise contribute to state practice and opinio juris should be taken into account, being 'participation' in instruments containing non-refoulement to persecution provisions.
C Fundamentally Norm-Creating Character
The first element is that the provision must 'be of a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law'. 250 Non-refoulement's fundamental character has been expressed in several of ExCom's nonbinding Conclusions. 268 These have referred to non-refoulement's general acceptance by states. 269 The totality of this evidence supports the conclusion that non-refoulement, encompassing the persecution strand, is of a fundamentally norm-creating character. 270 In North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ held that the relevant provision was not of a fundamentally norm-creating character. 271 One factor contributing to this was that there were 'very considerable … unresolved controversies as to the' rule's exact meaning and scope which raised doubts as to its fundamentally norm-creating character. 272 While there is no controversy surrounding non-refoulement to persecution's general meaning, the discussion on art 33(1) in Part II indicates there is some controversy surrounding its extraterritorial application. 273 However, Part II indicates there is substantial scholarly support for art 33(1)'s extraterritorial application. 274 Therefore, while some states disagree with this interpretation, 275 the strength of their argument is not considerable enough to raise doubts about non-refoulement to persecution's fundamentally norm-creating character.
Non-refoulement to persecution is found in binding international instruments other than the Refugee Convention, including the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
D Widespread and Representative Participation
The second element suggests that a very widespread and representative participation in a treaty may 'suffice of itself' to establish a CIL rule if it includes the participation of states whose interests are specifically affected. 276 281 An examination of major international treaties reveals 151 states have ratified or acceded to at least one treaty containing a non-refoulement to persecution provision. 282 This is roughly 23 per cent less participants than to the Geneva Conventions, which is significant enough to raise doubts that state participation is widespread and representative enough on its own to justify concluding a CIL rule exists.
E State Practice and Opinio Juris
The final element is that state practice must be both extensive and virtually uniform, and must show a rule's existence. 284 This latter factor refers to opinio juris. This is shown by a belief held by states that the practice is obligatory due to a binding rule's existence. 
Practice of States Parties versus Non-States Parties
In North Sea Continental Shelf, the ICJ held that evidence of opinio juris could not be derived from the practice of states in simply complying with their treaty obligations, as an inference could not be drawn from this 'that they believe themselves to be applying a mandatory rule of' CIL;
286 it should be derived from practice by states who are not parties to the relevant treaty.
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However, it is unlikely the ICJ was referring to near universally accepted treaties. 288 North Sea Continental Shelf concerned a treaty that was ratified by very few states. 289 With near universally accepted treaties, practically all potential participants are States Parties, leaving little evidence available to demonstrate that non-States Parties behave in accordance with a rule. 290 Nor is the practice of the relatively small number of non-State Parties indicative of a general perception among states of a rule's existence. 291 Therefore, where participation in a treaty is very widespread, the practice of non-States Parties is not necessary, or readily ascertainable for that matter, and the practice of States Parties carry probative weight, even where simply complying with treaty obligations.
292
When it is shown that States Parties act in a particular way because they are required not only by their treaty obligation but also by a CIL rule, that carries greater probative weight as opinio juris of the rule's existence 293 (for example, where statements supporting a CIL rule's existence accompany States Parties' practice). 294 Although 151 States bound by a treaty containing a non-refoulement to persecution provision does not represent universal acceptance, it does represent a significant portion of states. Therefore, while there still is a reasonable number of non-States Parties that can evidence state practice and opinio juris, the practices of States Parties carry probative weight in establishing non-refoulement to persecution's CIL status.
State Inaction
Inaction can evidence state practice of prohibitory rules. 295 Non-refoulement to persecution involves such a prohibition. However, inaction does not necessarily indicate the existence of opinio juris. 296 While state practice supporting non-refoulement to persecution can be implied by state inaction in not refouling refugees, it is difficult to show this inaction occurs due to states' beliefs in the rule's existence.
Positive Practice
Positive actions evidencing state practice and opinio juris include declarations, the passing of laws, and responses to occurrences of refoulement or prima facie refoulement.
The volume of evidence that can be adduced to show extensive and virtually uniform state practice is too great to address for the purpose of this article. This article relies predominantly on the work of Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, 297 and Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, 298 who have addressed state practice and opinio juris in detail and concluded it justifies a finding that nonrefoulement to persecution, encompassing art 33(1), has become CIL.
As Hathaway maintains the standard of state practice and opinio juris are not yet met, 299 some of the issues raised by him are addressed.
(a) Acceptance in International and Domestic Law
The widespread and representative participation of states in treaties containing nonrefoulement to persecution provisions, 300 as well as the wide recognition of non-refoulement to persecution in other non-binding instruments, 301 evidence state practice and opinio juris supporting non-refoulement to persecution's existence under CIL. 304 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, annex 2.2. 305 See, eg, Albania, Argentina, Togo, and Cameroon: ibid. taken separate legislative action, 306 including two non-States Parties, Lebanon and Iraq. 307 This domestic legislation further evidences state practice and opinio juris supporting nonrefoulement to persecution's CIL status. 308 
(b) Mere Statements/Declarations
Hathaway contends simple declarations are not sufficient to create CIL and a large representative group of states must solidify their commitment to a rule through actions. 309 This is supported by the ICJ, which held that mere declarations of a rule's existence are not sufficient for it to become CIL. 310 However, declarations cannot be ignored. 311 State practice must be appraised in light of instances where states have expressed their recognition of a CIL rule. 312 Therefore, statements will carry probative weight when they accompany state practice.
Some suggest that statements can evidence CIL in other circumstances. 313 More recent ICJ decisions recognise the normative value of General Assembly resolutions, stating they may act as evidence that go toward establishing the emergence of a CIL rule or an opinio juris. 314 Given it is state practice that must occur in a way that shows opinio juris, 315 this is likely an acknowledgement by the ICJ that things less than physical actions can be adequate state practice. So while mere statements cannot create norms, they can show a norm's existence or emergence. Where they do, the weight attached to them is reduced where the state has not acted upon them and no reasonable explanation exists for this failure. 316 An analogy can be made from the ICJ's decision in Nuclear Tests, which recognised that unilateral declarations create legal obligations when the declaring state intends to become bound by its declaration. 317 Given declarations can bind states, they should also be able to evidence state practice and opinio juris in respect of the declaring State. Where a declaration is made in a way that indicates a state believes it is bound by a CIL rule, then this should have that effect and evidence state practice and opinio juris, 318 assisting in the emergence of CIL. This is especially applicable to prohibitory rules, such as non-refoulement, due to the difficulty in showing opinio juris accompanies inaction, placing increased reliance on statements to indicate opinio juris.
Several CIL scholars argue that the importance of state practice in establishing CIL has reduced. Cheng, examining the CIL status of two General Assembly Resolutions on outer space, contends that CIL can develop instantly. 319 Cheng argues that state practice is only relied on because it evidences a rule's contents and the opinio juris of states. 320 All that is required is that opinio juris be clearly established, making it the material element. 321 This suggests that state practice may not play as significant a role as implied in North Sea Continental Shelf. Lepard supports this, contending that state practice's primary function is to evidence opino juris. 322 This is consistent with the latter part of the ICJ's reasoning in North Sea Continental Shelf, that state practice must occur in a way that indicates opinio juris. 323 Baxter adopts a similar view in the context of treaties evidencing CIL, stating that 'firm statements by [a] State of what it considers to be the rule is far better evidence of its position than what can be pieced together from the actions of that country at different times in a variety of contexts'. 324 Therefore, whether state practice takes the form of actions or statements is not significant; it just needs to clearly indicate the existence of a common opinio juris among states.
ExCom Conclusions carry weight in this area as they reflect the opinion of states whose interests are specifically affected by refugee issues. 325 Many Conclusions have reiterated the importance of non-refoulement in the Refugee Convention, 326 and Conclusion 6 commented on the general acceptance by states of the principle of non-refoulement, 327 indicating ExCom States believe non-refoulement to persecution is embedded in CIL.
The Declaration of States Parties, which was endorsed by the General Assembly, acknowledged the principle of non-refoulement was embedded in CIL. 328 The 126 States Parties present 329 adopted it unanimously. 330 This is strong evidence of these states' opinio juris, supporting non-refoulement to persecution's CIL status.
Over the years numerous states' representatives have recognised non-refoulment to persecution's CIL status. For example, in 1997, Denmark regarded art 33(1)'s non-refoulement provision as being embedded in CIL. 331 In 2001, the Belgium representative, speaking on behalf of the European Union and 13 other European States, noted in relation to the Refugee Convention that non-refoulement had long been part of CIL.
332 This is strong evidence of these states' opinio juris.
(c) Support of Non-States Parties
Hathaway cites in support of his argument, that many Asian and Near East States have routinely refused to be formally bound by non-refoulement. 333 What Hathaway does not recognise is that a state's refusal to be bound by a treaty such as the Refugee Convention does not indicate their unwillingness to be bound by non-refoulement per se. They may simply object to other provisions, some of which provide rights to refugees 334 such as protection from discrimination and protection from penalisation for unlawful entry. 335 Malaysia and Indonesia are examples of this. Refugees in these countries have very few rights and sometimes face penalties for their 'irregular' arrival. 336 However, both States cooperate with the UNHCR by receiving asylum seekers and allowing the UNHCR to process them. 337 Their actions indicate they do not engage in the refoulement of refugees and respect the principle of non-refoulement to persecution, 338 supporting a belief they are bound by a CIL rule. 339 Thailand has expressed that 'in line with the principle of non-refoulement, asylum countries were under an obligation to' admit refugees, 340 suggesting Thailand believes non-States Parties are bound by non-refoulement.
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In addition, the actions of Syria and Jordan, which both let in hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees during and after the Iraq war, 342 supports non-refoulement to persecution's existence in CIL. 348 Hathaway fails to recognise that occurrences of refoulement do not necessarily indicate a lack of belief in the rule's existence. State practice does not have to conform perfectly to the rule. 349 It is sufficient if practice is generally consistent with the rule. 350 Inconsistent practices 'should generally be treated as breaches of the rule'. 351 Where a state acts prima facie inconsistently with the rule, but tries to defend its conduct as not breaching or being an exception to the rule, then regardless of whether such actions are correct or not, this confirms rather than weakens the rule. 352 This is because a state's attempt to explain its conduct indicates that the state believes a binding rule exists. 353 Therefore, it is sufficient if there is a consistent and settled practice supporting the rule's existence. 354 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argue that occurrences of refoulement by states have been accompanied by arguments that no obligation attached to the persons returned, on grounds of their refugee status or due to exceptions to non-refoulement, particularly in regard to threats to national security. 355 On other occasions, justification is made on the basis of mass influxes of refugees being an exception to non-refoulement. Mass influxes can place significant strain upon a host state, 356 particularly 'fragile and poor' states.
(d) Specific Occurrences of Refoulement
357 Some scholars consider mass influxes to be an exception to art 33(1), 358 including Hathaway, who has stated 'non-refoulement does not bind a state faced with a mass influx of refugees insofar as the arrival of refugees truly threatens its ability to protect its most basic national interests'.
(i) Tanzanian Border Closure to Rwandan and Burundian Refugees
In 1994, during the Great Lakes emergency, thousands of Rwandans fled to Tanzania to escape the Rwandan genocide. 360 As the crisis entered its post-emergency phase, the relief assistance provided to Tanzania declined. 361 In mid-1995, Tanzania closed its borders to thousands of Rwandan and Burundian refugees. 362 In 1996, it expelled 250,000 Rwandan refugees. 363 While these are prima facie breaches of non-refoulement, a closer examination is required.
The huge numbers of refugees stretched Tanzania's resources and caused security concerns. 364 Without adequate support provided from the international community, Tanzania was unable to cope with the burden of so many refugees to protect, invoking security and mass influx as reasons for the refoulement, indicating Tanzania's belief this was an exception to, and not a breach of, the rule. 365 Consistent with this, on other occasions Tanzania claimed those returned were not refugees but illegal aliens subject to expulsion. 366 On one occasion where Burundian refugees were refouled, Tanzania stated that this had occurred accidentally, due to a misunderstanding of national policy. 367 These justifications confirm rather than weaken the rule. 368 
(ii) Macedonia's Border Closure to Albanians
In the lead-up to the Kosovo crisis in the late 1990s, Macedonia stated it would close its borders if a mass influx occurred. 369 NATO commenced bombing Kosovo on 24 March 1999 following which thousands of Albanian refugees fled to Macedonia. 370 Macedonia accepted these refugees until 31 March 1999. 371 However, when a further 25,000 arrived on 1 April 1999, only 3,000 were permitted to enter. 372 The remainder were let in on 4 April 1999 when an agreement was reached to reopen the borders. 373 accept more refugees 375 as its health system was already stretched prior to the crisis and the number of refugees who entered and sought to enter Macedonia, relative to its small population, was huge. 376 Albanians were the largest ethnic minority in Macedonia. 377 Macedonia feared that an influx of Albanians would upset its ethnic balance, destabilising its fragile political situation and radicalising the already restless Albanian minority. 378 Macedonia's warning it would close its borders constituted a pre-emption that a mass influx of Albanian refugees posed a national security threat. 379 Macedonia feared the collective threat a mass influx of Albanian refugees posed, constituted a substantial risk to its political security.
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Macedonia's later actions support this. After opening its borders, Macedonia closed them again for a short period to ensure a balance between the number of Albanians entering and leaving. 381 That Macedonia sought to defend its conduct as not breaching non-refoulement to persecution, rather than arguing the rule does not exist, 382 strengthens the rule's existence.
(iii) The US's Interception of Haitians
In 1981, US President Reagan issued an Executive Order to intercept in international waters, and return, people fleeing Haiti, except for legitimate refugees. 383 The same Order required the observance of 'international obligations concerning those who genuinely feared persecution'. 384 This indicates the US believed it was bound not to return refugees intercepted on the high seas. 385 This policy continued for over a decade. 386 Following the coup against the Haitian President in 1991, the number of asylum seekers fleeing Haiti increased. 387 In 1992, President Bush issued a new Executive Order for the interception and return of all Haitians attempting to enter the US by the high seas. 388 The US justified its actions by arguing non-refoulement to persecution did not apply extraterritorially. 389 In 1989, it had commented that while its practice was to not return people likely to be persecuted, this did not reflect a principle of CIL or apply to refugees not yet within a state's territory. 390 These actions and comments starkly contradict the US's practice over the previous eight years. 391 In 1982, the US Attorney General wrote to the UNHCR stating the United States was firmly committed to non-refoulement and that the US had taken steps to ensure persons intercepted at sea who had a 'colourable claim of asylum' were brought to the US for formal application processing to ensure nobody with a fear of persecution was mistakenly returned to Haiti. 392 In 1987, the US affirmed the importance of non-refoulement to persecution.
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According to Goodwin-Gill, non-refoulement to persecution has existed as a CIL rule since before 1992 when the US changed its policy and started intercepting and returning Haitian refugees. 394 Therefore, the US's actions breach non-refoulement to persecution, as opposed acting as evidence against its existence.
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That the US employed a policy not to return Haitians with 'colourable' refugee claims for over a decade indicates it believed there was a rule prohibiting the refoulement of refugees on the high seas. 396 This led Goodwin-Gill to conclude the 1989 comment was just a self-serving comment drafted with the future Haitian interception programme in mind that came too late to excuse the US from liability.
397 Therefore, the policy to return Haitian refugees should not be considered state practice contrary to the CIL status of non-refoulement to persecution, or its extraterritoriality, as it was purely politically motivated and contrary to the US's previous position which appeared to support non-refoulement's CIL status. 413 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n 17, 143-4. 414 Ibid 149. opinio juris. Therefore, the two necessary elements identified in North Sea Continental Shelf are met, indicating non-refoulement to persecution has become embedded in CIL. In a refugee context, this encompasses art 33(1) and applies extraterritorially. 415 
IV LEGALITY OF AUSTRALIA'S POLICY
The conclusions reached in Parts II and III indicate that Australia's obligation not to refoule refugees can apply to refugees outside Australia's territory. This raises the question of whether Australia's actions enforcing its turn-back policy breach art 33(1) or its CIL counterpart. In order to consider this question, it is necessary to firstly understand how refugee status and nonrefoulement apply in practice.
A Refugee Status
Protection from refoulement is granted to any person who meets the Refugee Convention art 1 definition of 'refugee'. 416 A person meets this definition by virtue of his or her circumstances. 417 As soon as a person satisfies art 1's criteria, he or she is a refugee. 418 Therefore, non-refoulement applies independently of any formal refugee status determination; 419 which is purely declaratory in nature. 420 The corollary of this is that if Australia refoules a refugee without adequately assessing his or her refugee status, Australia cannot claim lack of knowledge or lack of formal refugee status as a defence; it will have breached its obligations.
B Status Determination Process
The Refugee Convention does not stipulate a procedure for refugee status determinations. However, its object and purpose support the need for case-by-case assessments of refugee status. 421 Where a state fails to properly identify and protect refugees, it breaches its non-refoulement obligations. 422 This means asylum claims must be examined on their substantive merits 423 on an individual basis 424 if asylum seekers are to be returned without breaching international law. 425 As such, Australia can only avoid breaching its obligations by ensuring that all asylum seekers who may be protected from refoulement have their refugee status properly determined. 426 
C What is Prohibited
The prohibition in art 33(1) and its CIL counterpart on returning refugees to 'territories' 427 indicates that the formal status of where refugees may not be refouled to is irrelevant, and is not limited to the refugees' country of origin. 428 Return to any territory where they risk being persecuted is prohibited. 429 Typically, refoulement involves refugees being directly returned to a territory where they face a risk of persecution. However, indirect refoulement is also prohibited. 430 This occurs in two ways. It occurs where a state simply turns around a boat, leaving refugees with no option but to return on their own accord to a territory where they face a risk of persecution. 431 It also occurs where a state returns refugees to another state; or turns around a boat, leaving refugees with no option but to return on their own accord to another state and the other state then returns the refugees to a territory where they face a risk of persecution. 432 This latter liability on the original refouling state exists because of art 33(1)'s prohibition on refoulement in 'any manner whatsoever'. 433 Therefore, while non-refoulement does not require states to grant asylum, 434 it does require them to adopt a course of action that does not lead to refugees being returned to territories where they face a risk of persecution, whether directly or indirectly. 435 States may only return refugees if there is no real chance this will occur.
D Application to Australia
Non-refoulement obligations bind all of a State's organs 437 as well as any entity acting on its behalf. 438 Therefore, BPC which carries out Australia's 'turn-back' policy 439 is bound by Australia's non-refoulement obligation. 440 Whether Australia has breached this obligation is discussed with respect to two incidents detailed below.
Escorted Back to Indonesia
The first incident concerned 18 asylum seekers intercepted near Ashmore Reef on 1 May 2014, and the three-day escort of their boat closer to Indonesia by BPC. 441 On 4 May, three additional asylum seekers were placed on the boat, before BPC directed them towards Indonesian territory and then left. 442 There is little doubt that art 33(1) governs these acts. Part II identified that art 33(1) applies extraterritorially wherever states exercise jurisdiction, 443 which occurs where states exercise effective control or authority over persons. 444 This includes when states detain people on a vessel flying their state flag, 445 as occurred here in respect of the three asylum seekers transferred to the boat. State vessels intercepting boats, including engaging in turning boats around and transferring refugees, also meet the control threshold. 446 This boat's escort back to Indonesia involves greater control than simply turning a boat around as the escorting BPC vessel determined where the asylum boat went. Therefore, BPC arguably exercised effective authority over the boat and the asylum seekers on board it, extending art 33(1)'s operation onto them.
Obligations can also arise irrespective of physical control if the interception occurred in the contiguous zone. 447 Australia's choice to have a contiguous zone and to patrol it in order to prevent the infringement of its immigration laws brings the whole zone within Australia's jurisdiction for these purposes.
contiguous zone is afforded the same protection as one who reaches its territorial sea. It is unclear whether this boat reached Australia's contiguous zone. However, following the turnback policy, the interception was likely to have occurred once the boat reached Australia's contiguous zone. 449 Therefore, art 33(1) would arguably apply to the asylum seekers on this boat who are refugees. No reports suggest these asylum seekers had their refugee status determined. However, as refugee status determinations are purely declaratory in nature, 450 if any were refugees, Australia's failure to identify and protect them would arguably breach art 33(1). 451 A Parliament of Australia research paper indicates that under the Howard Government's Pacific Solution (which is similar to the current turn-back policy), between September 2001 and February 2008, 70 per cent of asylum seekers arriving by boat were found to be refugees. 452 During 2009 and 2010 under the Rudd Government, 73 per cent were found to be refugees. 453 Therefore, there is a strong possibility that boats containing asylum seekers which are intercepted by Australian authorities would contain some refugees. This means there is a strong possibility Australia refouled refugees in this case.
The Commonwealth Government might contend that by returning refugees to Indonesia, they are not being returned to a territory where they face a risk of persecution. However, Australia cannot guarantee that the refugees will not be refouled by Indonesia because it is simply escorting them to the edge of Indonesia's territory. It has no agreement in place with Indonesia with respect to refugees returned in this manner to ensure they are protected. Consequently, the return of these asylum seekers would arguably breach art 33(1).
As the CIL version of non-refoulement to persecution encompasses art 33(1), 454 CIL would also arguably be breached.
Detention and Transfer of Sri Lankans
The second case involves the interception and detention by BPC of Sri Lankan asylum seekers of Sinhalese and Tamil ethnicities west of Cocos Islands in late June 2014, before their transfer to Sri Lankan authorities on 6 July. 455 These asylum seekers were screened to identify if any ought to be referred to a further determination process. 456 However, only three basic questions were asked: 'What are your reasons for coming to Australia? Do you have any other reasons for coming to Australia? Would you like to add anything else?' 457 If refugees did not state they sought asylum because they feared persecution, they were screened out and returned.
As discussed above, the detention of asylum seekers on an Australian vessel, as is the case here, extends the operation of art 33(1) onto those detained.
This incident differs from the previous one because brief screening occurred here. Although it is up to states to determine the process they use to assess refugee status, 459 that does not mean states can utilise inadequate procedures. If a refugee is screened out, arguably Australia will have breached its non-refoulement obligations. 460 Given the alleged slaughter of Tamils by Sri Lanka's military toward the end of it civil war, 461 and the alleged ongoing mistreatment and torture of Tamils by Sri Lanka's government agencies, 462 it is likely that some of the asylum seekers were refugees. It is doubtful that Australia's screening process successfully identified these refugees as only one asylum seeker was identified as possibly having a claim to asylum. 463 Such a small proportion contradicts historical rates of successful claims made by Sri Lankan asylum seekers who arrive by boat, which is between 80 to 90 per cent. 464 Therefore, it is likely there were refugees among those returned. Given they were returned to authorities of the state they sought to flee from, which authorities have been suspected of severely mistreating Tamils, their return probably breached art 33(1).
As the CIL version of non-refoulement to persecution encompasses art 33(1), 465 CIL would also probably be breached.
V CONCLUSION
The above discussions and conclusions indicate that BPC's actions in enforcing Australia's turn-back policy may have possibly breached Australia's international obligations imposed by the Refugee Convention and CIL not to refoule refugees to territories where they face a risk of persecution.
The challenges associated with enforcement of Australia's international obligations, and the concerns regarding the implications for Australia and those who may possibly have been refouled should be noted. One of the major problems of the Refugee Convention is that it 'lacks a supra-national enforcement mechanism with de facto power to compel state behaviour'. 466 It does not provide for the possibility of individual complaints against states to be made in international courts or tribunals when alleged breaches occur.
If Australia is to continue its turn-back policy, it must adopt a course of action that is consistent with non-refoulement. 481 This means Australia can only turn back asylum seekers if it does not lead to refugees being refouled to territories where they face a risk of persecution. 482 Australia can only be sure this will not occur if they assess the refugee status of all asylum seekers that they intend to turn back, which must be determined by examining, on an individual basis, 483 the substantive merits of each asylum seeker's claim.
